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1. INTRODUCTION 
During 2002 significant changes were made to the listing rules of the New Zealand 
Exchange (NZX) and the Securities Market Act 1988. These reforms introduced an 
enhanced disclosure regime with NZX-listed companies now facing more stringent 
continuous disclosure listing rules that had statutory backing. The broad aim of these 
reforms was to enhance investor confidence in the New Zealand equity market by 
harmonising domestic securities law with international standards (Dalziel, 2002). This 
paper examines the impact of these reforms on two key measures of the financial 
information environment: the accuracy of analyst forecasts and the informational 
efficiency of stock prices. We hypothesise that the reforms should have increased the 
timeliness of disclosures in the post-reform period, improved analysts’ forecasts and 
moved stock prices more quickly to their full-information level. 
This research is significant for several reasons. First, although there have been 
significant reforms to disclosure regimes in several jurisdictions over the last decade, 
the empirical evidence on some aspects of these reforms is mixed. For example, prior 
studies into the effects of the enhanced disclosure reform in Australia (e.g., Brown et 
al., 1999) and Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) in the US (e.g., Heflin et al., 
2003; Bailey et al., 2003) found no strong evidence that either analysts’ forecast error 
or forecast dispersion improved in the post-reform period. In contrast Irani et al. 
(2003) found that forecast dispersion increased in the post-reform period following 
the introduction of Reg FD. Similarly Bailey et al. (2003) report an increase in analyst 
forecast dispersion post-Reg FD and an increase in other measures of disagreement 
suggesting post-Reg FD analysts have greater difficulty in forming forecasts. Dubow 
et al. (2006) report no strong evidence of any fall in the level of insider trading in the 
UK following the introduction of the Financial Services and Markets Act (FSMA) in 
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2001 which made it easier to prosecute breaches of the London Stock Exchanges’ 
listing rules that impose a general obligation on listed companies to provide price-
sensitive information to the market in a timely manner and also prohibit the selective 
disclosure of price-sensitive information.1  
Second, the empirical results will provide an initial assessment of the impact of the 
reform package and thus should be of interest to both sides of the regulatory debate in 
New Zealand and in other jurisdictions that have continuous disclosure requirements 
or obligations.2 Although the Securities Commission argued that the existing 
disclosure regime was not “international best practice” and in need of reform 
(Securities Commission, 2002), opponents of the reform package argued that the 
reforms were unnecessary and that the Government was mistaken in following 
Australian securities law rather than “best practice” US disclosure regulations 
(Franks, 2002). Furthermore, in the post-reform period, commentators have called for 
further refinements to the regulations, arguing that many companies were struggling 
with the requirement to make timely revisions to earnings forecasts (Gaynor, 2003). 
In this study we follow the methodology employed by Helfin et al. (2003) to test the 
impact of Regulation FD in the US. Specifically we examine analysts’ forecast 
performance and the informational efficiency of stock prices for a sample of NZX-
                                                 
1 Under Listing Rule 9 listed UK companies must notify the Company Announcements Office of the 
London Stock Exchange without delay any major new developments that are not public knowledge, 
any change in financial condition or expectation of performance, impending strategic developments 
where a breach of confidence may have occurred and other board decisions or announcements where 
the information may be price-sensitive.  See The Financial Services Authority (2000). 
2 The introduction of statutory backing for a continuous disclosure regime is part of the Government’s 
wider securities law reform programme. Reforms to the laws relating to insider trading and market 
manipulation are currently under discussion. 
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listed stocks over a two-year period immediately prior to the introduction of the 
reforms to New Zealand’s continuous disclosure regime and a two year period 
immediately following the introduction of the reforms. Our univariate analysis finds 
that both analysts’ median forecast errors and forecast dispersion are lower in the 
post-reform period. However when we use regression analysis to control for other 
factors we find only evidence of a decline in analysts’ forecast dispersion in the post-
reform period; the change in analysts’ forecast error is no longer significant. 
We also find the size of the stock price adjustments around earnings announcement 
dates to be lower in the post-reform period. The reduction in the information gap is 
concentrated in small firms, consistent with the argument that larger firms had better-
developed disclosure policies and practices prior to the reform and that the reforms 
were primarily of benefit to investors in smaller firms. Smaller firms have lower 
levels of analyst coverage and are generally characterised by higher levels of 
information asymmetry. Thus the more stringent continuous disclosure regime can be 
expected to reduce information asymmetry between managers and investors in mainly 
small stocks. 
Our paper contributes to the literature by presenting new evidence on the effects of 
the disclosure reforms of December 2002. To date the evidence on these reforms is 
mixed. Poskitt et al. (2005) find that these disclosure reforms had no impact on the 
level of informed trading in NZX-listed stocks while Frijns et al. (2006) report a 
decrease in the information asymmetry component of the bid-ask spread for less 
liquid stocks following the introduction of the enhanced disclosure rules. Research by 
Dunstan et al. (2005) suggests that, apart from firms expecting negative earnings 
changes, the disclosure behaviour of NZX-listed firms did not substantially alter in the 
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post-reform period. Dunstan et al. (2006), however, also report evidence than market 
adjusted returns for preliminary earnings announcements diminished in the post-
reform period. Our study finds evidence of a significant reduction in the dispersion of 
analysts’ forecasts in the post reform period. Similar to Dunstan et al. (2006) we also 
find a significant improvement in the informational efficiency of stock prices for 
small stocks3. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the 
background to the reforms and the major features of the reform package. Section 3 
develops the central hypotheses of the paper and Section 4 reviews the evidence from 
prior studies. Section 5 outlines the methodology employed. The sample of NZX-
listed firms and data are discussed in Section 6. The empirical results are presented in 
Section 7. Section 8 of the paper concludes. 
2. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 
During 2002 an enhanced continuous disclosure regime modelled on that of Australia 
was introduced in New Zealand. This reform involved changes to the listing rules of 
the NZX and amendments to the Securities Markets Act 1988. These reforms were 
introduced against a background of dissatisfaction with the regulatory regime 
governing the operation of the NZX. Successive governments had been prepared to 
take a light-handed approach to regulation, with the result that the NZX was perceived 
as an under-regulated market and out of step with international best practice. Both the 
                                                 
3 We use more rigorous sample selection criteria and employ difference control variables compared to 
Dunstan et al. (2006). In addition our study examines changes in analysts’ forecast errors in the post 
reform period. 
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Government and the NZX felt that international investor confidence would be 
enhanced if international investors could identify familiar standards. 
To implement the reforms the New Zealand Parliament enacted the Securities Market 
Amendment Act 2002. This act amended the Securities Market Act 1988, to take 
effect from 1 December 2002. The amendments introduced a statutory continuous 
disclosure obligation for NZX-listed companies and set forth substantial penalties for 
contravention of the NZX’s continuous disclosure regulations. Under section 19D of 
the Securities Market Amendment Act 2002 the continuous disclosure provisions 
were defined as: 
 “…. provisions that require a public issuer that is a party to a listing 
agreement with a registered exchange to notify information about events or matters as 
they arise for the purpose of that information being made available to participants in 
the registered exchange’s market”. 
Material information was also defined as information that (section 19E of the 
Securities Market Amendment Act 2002): 
“a reasonable person would expect, if it were generally available to the 
market, to have a material effect on the price or value of quoted securities of 
the public issuer”. 
The Securities Market Amendment Act 2002 provided that a listed company in 
contravention of the amendments to the Securities Market Act 1988 commits an 
offence and is liable to a fine of up to $30,000 by the Securities Commission. In 
addition the courts could impose pecuniary penalties on the listed company of up to 
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$300,000 on the application of the Securities Commission if it is satisfied that the 
company has contravened the regulations.4
At the same time as the reforms to the Securities Market Act 1988 were debated in 
Parliament during 2002 the NZX reviewed its listing rules relating to continuous 
disclosure. Prior to 2002, Listing Rule 10.1 required a listed company to treat 
information as an asset, to be used and applied for its overall benefit. Under this 
approach a listed company was expected to release “relevant information” to the NZX 
immediately that it ceased to have greater value to the company than for the 
information to remain confidential (NZX, 2002). The new listing rules were modelled 
on Listing Rule 3.1 of the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX). One important change 
was to dispense with the requirement that information be treated as an asset, instead 
requiring that material (i.e. price-sensitive) information be disclosed immediately, on 
the presumption that the information belongs to all investors (NZX, 2002). A 
company could no longer withhold information on the grounds that there was greater 
value to the company in retaining the information than in disclosure. 
Under both the old and new listing rules the NZX still allows “carve-out” provisions 
and non-disclosure of material information where all the following criteria are 
satisfied: a reasonable person would not expect the information to be disclosed; the 
confidentiality of the information is maintained; release of the information would 
                                                 
4 The legislation also included other measures such as the establishment of a co-regulatory framework, 
with the NZX as a frontline regulator administering the market and the Securities Commission 
overseeing the market; the tightening of insider trading rules; the establishment of the Securities 
Commission as a civil enforcement body for insider trading and continuous disclosure; increased 
powers of inspection by the Securities Commission; the requirement that directors and officers of 
publicly-listed companies must disclose securities dealings to the NZX within five trading days; and 
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breach a law or the information relates to an incomplete proposal, is a matter of 
supposition or is insufficiently definite to warrant disclosure, is generated for internal 
management purposes, or is a trade secret (NZX Listing Rule 10.1.1). 
Under the new listing rules, however, even if the exemptions under the carve-out 
provisions applied, disclosure is required soon as the relevant information is received 
by someone who might use it as a basis for trading. Immediate disclosure is also 
required if necessary to prevent the development or subsistence of a “false market” 
where prices are set by rumour and misinformation.5
3. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
The theoretical disclosure literature typically views enhanced disclosure regulation as 
a tool for eliminating the information asymmetry between informed and uninformed 
investors and the associated transfers of wealth that occur when these two classes of 
investors trade with each other (e.g., Kim, 1993). The NZX argues that continuous 
disclosure reduces information costs, assists investors in making informed decisions 
and enhances confidence in the integrity of the market by removing opportunities for 
insider trading and the creation of a false market (NZX, 2005).  
In this paper we are primarily interested in the impact of the new statutory-backed 
continuous disclosure regime on two earnings-related aspects of the financial 
information environment of NZX-listed stocks – the performance of analysts’ 
                                                                                                                                            
increases in penalties under the Securities Act 1978 to bring them into line with other domestic and 
international business law penalties. 
5 The new listing rules also carried forward the prohibition on selective disclosure of information but 
with a significant change. Companies are prohibited from disclosing information to the public prior to 
disclosing the information to the NZX and prior to receiving acknowledgement from the NZX that the 
information has been received. 
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earnings forecasts and price reactions to earnings announcements. We use analysts’ 
earnings forecasts as one measure of the financial information environment because 
analysts’ forecasts are used widely as a proxy for investor beliefs (e.g., Abarbanell et 
al., 1995). We also use the price reaction around earnings announcements to measure 
the information gap in the market immediately prior to earnings announcements. Prior 
research shows that the information content of an earnings announcement is widely 
anticipated (e.g., Ball et al., 1968; Beaver, 1968). A superior pre-announcement 
earnings information environment should result in a smaller price reaction around the 
earnings announcement date. 
The intent of the reforms is to encourage more timely disclosure of value-relevant 
information to investors. We expect this more timely disclosure to improve analysts’ 
forecast accuracy and reduce the disagreement among individual analysts’ forecasts. 
We also expect more timely disclosure to move stock prices closer to their full-
information post-announcement level during the period immediately prior to the 
earnings announcement. In summary, our two central hypotheses are: 
H1: Analysts’ forecast error and dispersion are lower in the post-reform period. 
and 
H2: The information gap is lower in the post-reform period. 
Although the arguments for expecting enhanced disclosure to improve the financial 
information environment appear sound, there are a number of arguments to the 
contrary. First, the reforms did not constitute a dramatic change. For example, existing 
securities market legislation proscribed insider trading and elements of a continuous 
disclosure regime and a prohibition against selective disclosure were already in 
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place.6 Thus it is quite possible that the research design may be unable to detect any 
impacts of the reforms. 
Second, the hypotheses advanced above are based on one view of how information is 
produced, processed and impounded into stock prices. Problems with the proposed 
disclosure regime may include (i) a reduced incentive for brokerage firms to invest in 
research; (ii) investors being deluged with too much information, and (iii) the critical 
role played by analysts in the dissemination of information and company research 
may be undermined.7  
A policy of more timely disclosures may therefore reduce the incentive for private 
information search since there is now a greater likelihood that the information will be 
released to the market before it can be discovered through private search activities 
(Kim et al., 1991). Thus the disclosure reforms might simply substitute public 
disclosures for private information production and leave the overall level of 
information unchanged.8
                                                 
6 The chief executive of the NZX, Mark Weldon, stated: “The [NZX] listing rules …. were basically 
continuous disclosure rules anyway, in the sense that if something was ‘relevant’ information you were 
required to disclose it. Is it a seismic shift? The answer is no. Is it important? The answer is yes. ….. It 
is important because it makes it slightly more visible and it makes it slightly more certain” (Pankhurst, 
2002). 
7 See Wilkinson (2003) for a discussion of some of the reasons why mandatory disclosure is 
not necessarily a good thing. We also thank Bryce Wilkinson for bringing to our intention that 
the impacts of the new continuous disclosure rules and the reforms to these rules are also 
empirical issues and that he did not assert (as suggested in earlier versions of our work) 
mandatory disclosure would necessarily lead to all these problems.  
8 Moreover, public disclosures provide investors with superior information processing skills the 
opportunity to process public information into valuable private information (Kim et al., 1994). Thus, to 
the extent that the enhanced disclosure regime will increase the volume of disclosures, the new regime 
will give these investors more opportunities to practice, and take advantage of, their unique skills. That 
is informational asymmetry may worsen and the level of information-based trading may increase. 
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Critics also observed that one should be careful not to equate more disclosure with 
better disclosure. One of the fears of the opponents of the reform was that investors 
may be inundated with a flood of information, much of which would be of little value 
to analysts and investors.9 Retail investors may have neither the time nor the expertise 
to analyse the expected deluge in additional information and, in the absence of 
analysis and interpretation by analysts, these investors might make poor investment 
decisions, potentially resulting in larger price shocks and higher price volatility.10
The prohibition on selective disclosure practices, such as providing private guidance 
to analysts’ earnings forecasts, may also threaten to diminish the role that analysts 
play in ensuring that stocks are priced efficiently. In addition impeding the flow of 
new information to analysts would hamper the process by which informed traders and 
analysts’ clients incorporated new information into prices, and thereby reduce market 
efficiency and pricing of stocks at their true fundamental value.11  
Gaynor (2002, 2003) also highlighted potential problems associated with the 
continuous disclosure as it applied to revisions of company profit forecasts in the 
immediate post-reform period. A number of factors constraining companies from 
                                                 
9 An early Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) study of the impact of Reg FD found that many 
investment professional believed that although the quantity of disclosures increased, the quality had 
deteriorated, with companies tending to issue more “boilerplate” press releases containing little useful 
in the way of information. See Unger (2001) for a discussion of this issue. 
10 Lee et al. (2006) argue, however, that stock idiosyncratic volatility comprises two components: (i) 
the noise component, and (ii) that part caused by information impacting on the fundamental value of 
the firm. More price information can decrease volatility by reducing the impact of noise traders. 
However more price information can increase stock volatility as the stock price more closely tracks the 
arrival of new information with respect to the fundamental value of the firm. 
11 This concern was voiced strongly by securities industry professionals in the US prior to the 
introduction of Reg FD. See Talosig (2004) for a summary of these arguments. 
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providing timely revisions to profit forecasts were identified, including the reluctance 
of companies to disclose downward revisions until the last moment, either in the hope 
that a turnaround could be achieved or to avoid a negative reaction by investors; the 
difficulty companies faced in distinguishing between an aberration and a trend, and; 
the problems companies faced in preparing forecasts outside their normal six-monthly 
budget cycle. 
Ultimately, the impact of the reforms on the earnings-related information environment 
is an empirical question. Before moving to a discussion of the empirical methods and 
data we briefly review relevant prior research. 
 
4. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this section we review the empirical evidence on the enhanced disclosure (ED) 
reform introduced in Australia in 1994 and the Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) 
reform introduced in the US in 2000. The ED reform in Australia places a continuous 
disclosure obligation on ASX-listed companies and provided statutory backing for 
this obligation. On the other hand Reg FD in the US prohibits private communications 
between listed companies and securities market professionals such as analysts.  
In respect of analysts’ forecasts, Brown et al. (1999) found that forecasts became 
more accurate and less dispersed in the post-reform ED period. However, after 
controlling for other determinants of analysts’ forecasts, they found no evidence of an 
improvement in analysts’ forecast performance in the post-reform period. In the case 
of Reg FD, researchers report mixed results. Heflin et al. (2003) found that analysts’ 
forecast became less accurate and more dispersed in the post-reform period. Again, 
 12
however, their multivariate analysis found no evidence that changes in forecast errors 
or dispersion were related to the implementation of Reg FD. The univariate analysis 
of Bailey et al. (2003) found that analysts’ forecast dispersion increased in the post-
reform period. Similarly, Irani et al. (2003) found that dispersion in analysts’ forecasts 
increased in the post-reform period in both their univariate and multivariate analyses. 
The evidence concerning the informational efficiency of stock prices is more 
consistent with predictions. Brown et al. (1999) found evidence that stock prices 
better anticipated the information content of listed companies’ annual earnings 
announcements in the post-reform period, indicating that the ED reform improved 
informational efficiency. The results were found, however, to be weak for large 
companies, suggesting that the reform had its greatest impact on the information 
environment for smaller companies. Heflin et al. (2003) found that deviations between 
pre- and post-announcement stock prices became smaller in the post-Reg FD period, 
indicating an improved informational efficiency of stock prices prior to earnings 
announcements in the post-reform period. Their multivariate analysis confirmed these 
findings. 
5. METHODOLOGY 
5.1 Analysts’ Forecasts 
We use two measures as proxies for analysts’ earnings forecast performance: forecast 
error and dispersion. Forecast error (FEit) for firm i at time t is measured as (Brown et 
al., 1987; Lang et al., 1996; Kwon, 2002): 
it
itit
it P
FEPSAEPSFE || −=         (1) 
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where AEPSit is the actual earnings per share for firm i at time t, FEPSit is the mean 
financial analysts’ earnings forecast as of the date of the most recently updated 
forecast prior to the announcement for firm i at time t and Pit is the stock price at the 
end of the firm’s fiscal year t for firm i. 
We construct forecast dispersion (FDit) for firm i at time t as follows (Heflin et al., 
2003): 
it
it
it P
SDFD =           (2) 
where SDit is the standard deviation of individual analysts’ forecasts as of the date of 
the last forecast of annual earnings prior to the earning’s announcement for firm i at 
time t and Pit is the stock price at the end of the firm’s fiscal year t for firm i. 
Since our objective is to examine changes in the information environment near the 
date of the earnings announcement, FEi and FDi are both measured on the date of the 
most recently updated forecast prior to the annual earnings announcements. Both FEi 
and FDi are scaled by the share price of the firm at the end of the fiscal year. Since 
computing forecast dispersion requires that at least two analysts issue the earnings 
forecasts, the analyses of forecast dispersion comprise fewer observations than the 
analyses of forecast errors.  
As a first step we compare measures from the pre- and post-reform periods. Since the 
Act took effect on 1 December 2002, we define the pre-reform period to be between 1 
January 2001 and 31 December 2002, and the post-reform period to be between 1 
January 2003 and 31 December 2004. If the reform provides more timely disclosures, 
average analysts’ forecast performance should improve as all analysts have the same 
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information set and price-sensitive information is disclosed earlier. Thus, both 
forecast error and forecast dispersion should decline in the post-reform period. 
However, if as critics argue, the new regime impairs analysts’ forecast performance, 
both measures should increase after the implementation of the reform. 
To control for other factors that may affect analyst’ forecast errors and forecast 
dispersion we also estimate the following pooled cross-sectional and time-series 
models where t = years 2000 to 2004: 
itititit
ititititit
eFDLOSSNEGE
ESUPANADAYSMVREFORMFE
++++
+++++=
876
543210
λλλ
λλλλλα
  (3) 
ititit
ititititit
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ESUPANADAYSMVREFORMFD
+++
+++++=
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543210
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  (4) 
where FEit and FDit are as defined in equations (1) and (2) respectively. REFORM is a 
dummy variable, which equals 1 if the observation is from the post-reform period, and 
0 otherwise. 
The other dependent variables are as follows (for convenience we abstract from the 
subscript time t = years 2000 to 2004). We include MVi, the natural log of total 
market capitalization at the beginning of the fiscal year for firm i to control for size 
since prior research finds that analysts’ forecast performance improves with firm size 
(Brown et al., 1999; Lang et al., 1996; Mensah et al., 2004). We expect MVi to be 
negatively associated with FEi and FDi. Furthermore, since later forecasts are more 
accurate than earlier forecasts prior to earnings announcements (Brown et al., 1999; 
Heflin et al., 2003; Kross et al., 1990), we include DAYSi, which is the natural log of 
the number of days by which the forecast precedes the earnings announcement for 
firm i, as a control for forecast horizon. We predict a positive relationship between 
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DAYS and analysts’ forecast performance. We include the number of analysts 
generating mean forecasts of earnings for firm i (ANAi) to capture analysts’ following 
because firms with more analysts’ following have smaller analysts’ forecast errors and 
forecast dispersion (Brown et al., 1999; Kwon, 2002).  
We also include as control variables several earnings characteristics of the firm that 
may have an impact on analysts’ forecasting ability. We control for earnings 
variability by including earnings surprise (ESUPi) since analysts encounter more 
difficulties forecasting earnings for firms with large changes in earnings (Heflin et al., 
2003; Lang et al., 1996). ESUPi is defined as the absolute value of the difference 
between the current year’s earnings per share (“EPS”) and last year’s EPS at time t , 
divided by the share price at the beginning of the fiscal year for firm i. 
Lastly, we include two indicator variables, negative earnings (NEGEi) and loss 
(LOSSi), to capture the transitory effect of declining earnings and negative profits 
since analysts’ forecasts exhibit more errors and dispersion when they follow firms 
with declining or negative earnings (Heflin et al., 2003). NEGEi takes the value of 1 if 
firm i’s current year EPS is below last year’s EPS, and 0 otherwise while LOSSi 
equals 1 if firm i’s reported profits are negative and 0 otherwise.  
In the regression model of absolute forecast error (equation (3)), a control for analyst 
disagreement (FDi) is incorporated since analysts disagree more when there is greater 
uncertainty about future earnings. This implies that their consensus forecasts are 
likely to be less accurate (Brown et al., 1999). 
The variable which interests us the most is REFORM. We expect the REFORM 
coefficient to be negative if the implementation of the new regime improves analysts’ 
forecast accuracy as more price-sensitive information has been released earlier and 
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prior to the actual profit announcement. If the REFORM coefficient is positive, 
however, the evidence would suggest consensus analysts’ forecast performance was 
impaired by the reform since they could no longer rely on management’s private 
earnings-related information. 
5.2 Informational Efficiency of Stock Prices 
To investigate the effect of the new disclosure regime on information flows to the 
stock markets, we analyze the degree to which pre-announcement stock prices 
assimilate earnings-related information. The absolute deviation between the price on 
any day prior to an earnings announcement and the full-information post-
announcement price is a measure of the information gap with regards to the upcoming 
earnings announcement. 
We use the event study methodology to assess the merits of the alternative 
explanations. In respect of information disclosure, the event-study methodology has 
been used to examine the impact of stock suspensions invoked to improve the 
informational efficiency of stock prices (Kryzanowski, 1978; Kryzanowski, 1979; 
Howe et al., 1986) and to examine fraud-on-the-market litigation cases (Steen, 1994). 
The traditional single-factor market model used in multiple event studies is often 
unsuitable for estimating expected returns and the measurement of abnormal returns 
when stocks do not trade each day. 
To control for any thin trading bias in respect of small stocks in the sample a “trade-
to-trade” approach using multi-period event returns is applied. Under the trade-to-
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trade returns approach the observed multi-period return ending on day t is (see 
Maynes et al., 1993):12
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where  is return to firm i over n
tni
R , t days,  is the observed price for firm i on day 
t,  is the unobserved price for firm i on day t - s (i.e., on a day the stock does not 
trade),  is the length of the return interval ending on day t (i.e., the number of days 
between observed or traded prices) and ln indicates that natural logarithms are used. 
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where  is the return on the market index over nRm nt, t days (where nt days matches the 
number of days between the observed or traded prices for firm i), βi is the parameter 
estimate for firm i taken from ordinary least squares estimates, αi is the intercept term 
for firm i taken from ordinary least squares estimates and εit is the error term. 
The error term in equation (6) will by heteroscedastic with variance equal to ntσi2 
(assuming the variance of residuals is proportional to the length of the period between 
 
12 Under an event simulation study Maynes et al. (1993) report that using a methodology based on 
trade-to-trade returns is much better specified for all trading frequencies than returns forecast using a 
‘lumped’ or ‘uniform’ treatment of missing trades. The lumped returns procedure assumes the stock 
return over non-trading days to be zero and assigns all the multi-period return to the day the stock 
actually trades. The uniform procedure allocates the return equally over all days in a multi-period 
interval where the stock does not trade. 
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trades). To estimate the α and β parameters in equation (6), a weighting scheme must 
be introduced whereby the return data are divided by the square root of nt. The 
parameters α and β are estimated by equation (7) below: 
ti
t
nmi
ti
t
ni
n
R
n
n
R
tt
,
,, μβα ++=       (7) 
This correction (equation (7)) ensures that var(μjt) is independent of nt. We use a 
period of 180 trading days prior to the event window period (days [-10,+10]) to 
estimate the market model parameters in equation (7). 
The abnormal return for firm i over the event period is calculated as: 
[ ]
ttt ninini
RERAR ,,, −=        (8) 
where is the abnormal return for firm i over the period n
tni
AR , t days and [ ]tniRE ,  is 
the expected return for firm i over the period nt days using the α and β parameter 
estimates from equation (7). 
Standard event study parametric statistical tests are used to detect evidence of 
abnormal returns (see Patell, 1976; Maynes et al., 1993). 
Since our objective is to examine changes in the information environment around the 
date of the earnings announcement, we compute the absolute cumulative abnormal 
return (ACAR) for each stock over the event window period days [-10,+10], where 
day 0 is the fiscal year end earnings announcement date of the firm.  The ACAR for 
firm i on each of t trading days around the annual earnings announcement is measured 
as: 
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where ARit is the abnormal return for firm i on day t. t = -x is defined as the number of 
days the accumulation window extends backward from the earnings announcement 
date (day zero) for each year 2000 to 2004, and t = +y is defined as the number of 
days the accumulation window extends forward from the earnings announcement date 
for each year 2000 to 2004. 
Thus, ACARi,t measures the absolute percentage change in price, after abstracting 
from market-wide movements, from t equal to x days before to y days after the annual 
earnings announcement. It also measures the extent to which the information about 
the upcoming announcement is not reflected in the stock price starting x days prior to 
the announcement (i.e., the information gap). A higher ACARi,t implies a larger 
information gap while a lower ACARi,t indicates a smaller information gap and higher 
informational efficiency of stock prices (Heflin et al., 2003). 
Since the reform requires listed companies to disclose information in a more timely 
fashion, the market should move the price earlier and faster to its full information 
post-announcement level. This should be reflected in lower ACARs in the post-reform 
period compared to the pre-reform period. However, if investors react immediately 
based on the information without filtering it or considering other factors, the reform 
might result in larger price shocks and higher price volatility. If this is the case, higher 
ACARs may be observed in the post-reform period compared to the pre-reform 
period. 
We also use a regression model to control for any changes in ACAR resulting from 
factors unrelated to the reform. Our sample selection procedure ensures each pre- and 
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post-reform fiscal year contains the same firms, largely controlling for stationary 
firm-specific factors. We therefore focus primarily on controlling for those factors 
that are likely to have changed between the pre- and post-reform periods but unrelated 
to the reform. Accordingly, we estimate the following pooled cross-sectional and 
time-series regression for t = years 2000 to 2004. 
ACARi,t = α +λ 1 REFORM + λ MBx,0 2 it + λ LEV3 it + λ MV4 it + λ ESUP5 it + λ LOSS6 it 
+ λ NEGCAR7 it + ei,t         (10) 
 
Our main variable of interest is REFORM, which takes the value of 1 if the earnings 
announcement is from the post-reform period, and 0 otherwise. We expect the 
REFORM coefficient to be negative if earnings–related information availability 
improved in the post-reform period. 
We include the ratio of market to book value of equity at the beginning of the fiscal 
year for firm i (MBi) to control for growth opportunities.13 High growth firms have 
greater information asymmetry between insiders and investors and we expect MBi to 
be positively related to ACARs (e.g., Collins et al., 1989; Gaver et al., 1993). The 
ratio of total liabilities to total assets for firm i (LEVi) captures default risk of debt and 
is expected to yield a positive relationship with the ACARs (e.g. Dhaliwal et al., 
1991).  
We include the natural log of total market capitalization at the beginning of the fiscal 
year for firm i (MVi) to control for firm size, as evidence suggests that stock prices of 
large firms reflect the information content of reported earnings earlier and faster than 
small firms (e.g., Atiase, 1985; Freeman, 1987; Ro, 1988).  
                                                 
13 Again for convenience we abstract from the subscript time t = years 2000 to 2004. 
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Finally, following Holthausen et al. (1988), we include a set of variables to control for 
information-related factors unrelated to the reform. ESUPi, LOSSi and NEGCARi are 
included in this category of controls. ESUPi equals the absolute value of the 
difference between the current EPS and last year’s EPS at time t, divided by the share 
price at the beginning of the fiscal year for firm i. We expect a bigger EUSP to be 
associated with a larger ACAR in response to the earnings announcement. LOSSi 
takes the value of 1 if a firm’s reported profits are negative, and 0 otherwise to capture 
pre-announcement information and the differences in the accuracy of the earnings 
signal (e.g., Francis et al., 1996; Hayn, 1995). We expect losses to impair the market’s 
ability to forecast the upcoming earnings numbers. NEGCARi equals 1 if the 
cumulative abnormal return is negative over the event window period [-10,+3], and 0 
otherwise. The variable captures inherent price variability since greater price 
movements are more likely to occur when prices decrease compared to when prices 
increase (e.g., Christie, 1982). We expect both LOSSi and NEGCARi to be positively 
related to the firm’s ACAR (e.g., Christie, 1982; Hayn, 1995; Heflin et al., 2003). 
 
6. DATA 
6.1 Sample Period 
We examine the effect of the reform by analyzing changes in various proxies for the 
firms’ financial information environment prior to the annual earnings announcements 
during a two-year period before and after the introduction of the new regime. As 
noted earlier, since the Act took effect in December 2002, we define the pre-reform 
period to be 1 January 2001 - 31 December 2002, and the post-reform period to be 1 
January 2003 - 31 December 2004. 
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6.2 Sample Selection and Data Collection 
To be included in our sample a NZX-listed company must be continuously listed for 
the four-year sample period. Actual and forecast annual EPS data are collected from 
International Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S). I/B/E/S covers only 83 NZX-listed 
companies in total. We eliminate 43 stocks where I/B/E/S does not have the required 
data for all four years of the sample period or there is an incomplete data set for the 
control variables. Our final sample for the analysis of analysts’ forecasts consisted of 
40 NZX-listed stocks. 
We obtained data on the market index, adjusted stock returns and a non-trading flag 
from the NZX for New Zealand firms that were continually listed for the entire four 
year period between 2000 and 2004.  The sample for the analysis of stock price 
information efficiency comprises 62 NZX-listed stocks. Data for the control variables 
and earnings announcement dates were all sourced from Datex.  
7. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
7.1 Analysts’ Forecasts 
7.1.1 Univariate Tests 
Table 1 provides a comparison of the mean and median analysts’ forecast errors and 
forecast dispersion during the pre-reform and post-reform periods. The results for the 
forecast error are mixed and offer little support for H1. The median absolute forecast 
error decreased from 0.0092 in the pre-reform period to 0.0060 in the post-reform 
period consistent with hypothesis H1. However this difference is not significant at the 
0.05 level. In contrast, the mean absolute forecast error increased from 0.0253 in the 
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pre-reform period to 0.0429 in the post-reform period (but again the difference was 
not statistically significant). 
The results for forecast dispersion are more uniform. The mean (median) forecast 
dispersion decreased from 0.0118 (0.0063) in the pre-reform period to 0.0072 
(0.0043) in the post-reform period. These differences are statistically significant at the 
0.05 level. These results suggest that analysts’ forecasts showed greater convergence 
in the post-reform period. The result is consistent with H1 suggesting that in the post-
reform period the same information set was available to all analysts. 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
7.1.2 Multivariate Analysis 
Panel A of Table 2 reports descriptive statistics on the control variables for the full 
sample period and separately for the pre-reform and post-reform periods. The p-
values show that in the post-reform period, only the decline in the median ESUP and 
mean and median NEGE are significant at the 0.10 level. This suggests, weakly, that 
earnings exhibited more time-series variability, and were more often higher than 
previous earnings in the post-reform period.  
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
Panel B of Table 2 shows the Pearson correlations between dependent variables (i.e., 
FE and FD), the REFORM dummy variable and the control variables. The data show 
that FE has a positive and significant relationship (at the 0.01 level) with FD, ESUP 
and LOSS, indicating that mean analysts’ forecast error is greater the higher the 
dispersion of analysts’ forecasts, or when earnings have more time-series variability 
or for firms that report a loss.   
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FD is significantly correlated at the 0.1 level or greater with all control variables 
except for DAYS and NEGE. Like FE, FD is positively correlated with ESUP and 
LOSS, suggesting analysts’ forecasts are more dispersed when they follow firms with 
more time-series variability in earnings and with negative reported profits. FD is 
significantly negatively correlated with MV and ANA, which implies that large firms 
and firms with greater analyst following have less analysts’ forecast dispersion. Most 
importantly, FD is negatively correlated with REFORM and the correlation is 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level, suggesting that analysts’ forecasts become 
less diverse in the post-reform period.  
It is noticeable that among the control variables, MV and ANA are highly correlated 
with a correlation co-efficient of 0.6630, statistically significant at the 0.01 level. It is 
likely that analysts have incentives to focus on large firms because they are more 
widely held, attract more interest from a broader set of investors and generate greater 
commissions for brokerage firms.14 To control for interdependence among these firm 
specific variables, we include either MV or ANA (but not both) in the regression 
models. 
Table 3 presents estimation results from OLS and fixed effects regression models with 
FE as the dependent variable.15 If analysts’ forecast accuracy is improved by the 
                                                 
14 There is a large literature on the determinants of analysts following. Arbel et al. (1983) document 
that since financial analysts’ primary customers are institutional investors, they concentrate their 
activities on large firms. In a cross-sectional study, Bhushan (1989) investigates the key determinants 
of the number of analysts following and finds that the number of analysts following a firm is increasing 
in firm size. An alternative explanation for the large-firm focus of analysts is that large firms engage in 
more transactions and tend to be more diversified than small firms. Therefore, MV and ANA are 
positively and significantly correlated. 
15 In OLS regressions we employed the Belsley et al. (1980) approach and measure the condition index 
to detect for multicollinearity. The condition index is defined as the square root of the ratio of the 
 25
reform, the sign of the coefficient on REFORM variable should be negative, 
consistent with H1. On the contrary, if the reform impaired analysts’ forecasting 
ability, the coefficient on REFORM should be positive. 
In models 1 and 2, the coefficient on REFORM is positive in both the OLS and fixed 
effects models but small in magnitude and not statistically significant at conventional 
levels. The forecast error is positively and significantly (at the 0.01 level) associated 
with ESUP, suggesting that analysts’ forecasts are less accurate in cases where there 
are significant changes in earnings. A positive and significant coefficient on LOSS 
also indicates that analysts have more difficulty forecasting earnings for firms with 
negative reported profits, and their forecasts exhibit less accuracy. These findings are 
consistent with prior evidence (e.g., Heflin et al., 2003; Lang et al., 1996). 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
Models 3 and 4 include the variable ANA in place of MV. The coefficient on 
REFORM in both the OLS and the fixed effects models are still positive but are again 
not significant. The coefficients on EUSP and LOSS are positive and significant at the 
0.01 level. In both models 1 to 4 inclusive the coefficient estimates for DAYS is 
negative (contrary to expectations) and not consistent with previous research which 
documents a negative relationship between dispersion in analysts’ forecasts and the 
forecast horizon (e.g., Heflin et al., 2003; Kross et al., 1990; Kwon, 2002).  
                                                                                                                                            
largest eigenvalue to each individual eigenvalue. The condition indexes were between 10 and 20 and 
we found no evidence of strong multicollinearity as evidenced by condition index values in excess of 
30. 
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Overall, our results show that after controlling for other factors there was no 
significant change in analysts’ forecast errors in the post-reform period. These results 
do not support hypothesis H1. 
The results from regression models with FD as the dependent variable are presented in 
Table 4. The coefficients on REFORM are negative and statistically significant at the 
0.05 level or better in all regression models, except for the fixed effects regression 
model 2 (column 4 of Table 4). The results suggest that analysts’ forecast dispersion 
decreased in the post-reform period, consistent with hypothesis H1. 
In all regressions (both OLS and fixed effects models) the coefficients on the control 
variable LOSS was positive and significant at the 0.10 level or better, suggesting 
analysts disagree more about forecast earnings for firms with negative reported 
profits. In addition, the negative and significant coefficient on MV (models 1 and 2) 
suggests that analysts’ forecasts are more disperse for smaller firms. The negative and 
significant relationship between ANA and FD in the OLS regression model 3 is also 
consistent with prior studies which have found that firms with more analysts 
following have less forecast disagreement (e.g., Kwon, 2002).  
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
Overall our finding that the reform is associated with a significant decline in analysts’ 
dispersion of earnings forecasts is consistent with hypothesis H1. In this respect our 
results differ from those reported by Brown et al. (1999) and Heflin et al. (2003) who 
found that neither forecast error nor forecast dispersion were affected by the reforms 
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that took place in the Australian and US markets respectively after controlling for 
other factors.16
7.2 Informational Efficiency of Stock Price 
7.2.1 Univariate Tests 
Figure 1 plots the mean and median ACARs commencing ten trading days before to 
ten trading days after the firm’s earnings announcements for both the pre- and post-
reform period. Panel A of Figure 1 shows that the mean post-reform ACARs are 
always smaller than the mean pre-reform ACARs in the 20 trading days surrounding 
the announcement day. The distance between the pre- and post-reform ACARs is 
relatively constant until day -2, when the gap widens over the period [-2,+3] and stays 
relatively constant thereafter. Panel A of Figure 1 suggests that the information gap, 
as reflected in the deviation between the pre-announcement price and the full 
information post-announcement price, is smaller in the post-reform period, indicating 
that the reform is associated with superior pre-announcement information and greater 
stock price efficiency. 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
Panel B of Figure 1 provides the results for the median ACARs. In respect of the 
median ACARS there is no striking difference between the pre and post-reform 
ACARS up to day [-1]. Over the days [0,+3] the median ACARs in the post-reform 
period drops below the median ACAR in the pre-reform period but the gap narrows 
again by day +8. 
                                                 
16 The univariate tests of Brown et al. (1999) and Heflin et al. (2003) did, however, find weak evidence 
of an increase in analysts’ forecast errors and dispersion following the disclosure reform. 
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Table 5 presents statistical tests of the differences between the pre- and post-reform 
pooled cross-sectional mean and median ACARs for five different accumulation event 
day window periods: [-2,+3], [-2,+4], [-3,+3], [-3,+4] and [-10,+3], where day 0 is the 
earnings announcement day. Day +3 is that day in the event window period that all 
stocks in the sample traded at least once subsequent to the announcement day 0. The 
post-reform mean and median ACARs are lower than the mean and median pre-
reform ACARs for all five window periods. The differences in the mean ACARs for 
the event windows [-2,+3], [-2,+4] and [-3,+3] between the pre- and post-reform 
periods are significant at the 0.05 level. This suggests that as the annual earnings 
announcement date approaches, pre-announcement post-reform prices move earlier to 
their full-information levels than pre-reform prices. This finding is consistent with 
hypothesis H2. 
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
In summary our univariate results provide some evidence that superior pre-
announcement information is available to market participants prior to earnings 
announcements after the enactment of the reform. Our univariate results are also 
consistent with the evidence of Heflin et al. (2003) and Brown et al. (1999) that share 
prices reflected more information regarding the upcoming earnings announcements 
and accounting data in the post-reform period. 
7.2.2 Regression Analysis 
Panel A of Table 6 displays descriptive statistics on the control variables in Equation 
(10) for the full sample period and the pre- and post-reform periods separately. The 
post-reform means and medians for the control variables are not significantly different 
from each other. 
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INSERT TABLE 6 HERE 
Panel B of Table 6 shows the Pearson correlation matrix for the REFORM indicator 
variable and the control variables. Although MB, LEV, LOSS and NEGCAR are all 
negatively related to REFORM, their correlations with REFORM are small in 
magnitude and not significant at conventional levels. REFORM has a positive 
correlation with MV and EUSP but again none of the correlations are significant. 
Among the control variables, MB is significantly and positively correlated with LEV 
suggesting more highly levered firms have a higher market-to-book ratio. MV is also 
significantly and positively correlated with MB and LEV, indicating that large firms 
are more likely to have a higher market-to-book ratio and higher leverage. The 
negative correlations between MV and EUSP, and MV and LOSS (significant at the 
0.01 level) suggest large firms are more likely to report a decrease in profit. LOSS is 
also positively correlated with LEV and EUSP suggesting more highly levered 
companies and firms that have a large earnings surprise are more likely to report a 
loss. 
Table 7 presents the results from the OLS and fixed effects regression models over 
each of the five accumulation windows.17 The REFORM coefficient is negative for all 
five accumulation windows and significant at the 0.10 level or better in all event 
window periods other than the period [-10,+3]. The results suggest that the deviation 
between the pre-announcement price and the full information post-announcement 
price declines in the post-reform period and that the market responds to information 
                                                 
17 In OLS regressions in Tables 7 and 8 we again calculated the condition index to detect for 
multicollinearity. Similar to our results in Tables 3 and 4 we found no evidence of any strong 
multicollinearity that may impact on our regression results. 
 30
about the upcoming annual earnings announcement earlier. That is, the pre-earnings 
announcement price is closer to its post-earnings announcement level earlier after the 
implementation of the reform compared to the pre-earnings announcement price pre-
reform. Again, this result is consistent with hypothesis H2. 
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE 
The results for control variables are mixed. The positive coefficients on LEV and 
LOSS (except for the fixed effect model in the period [-3,+5]) are consistent with 
previous studies (e.g., Dhaliwal et al., 1991; Hayn, 1995; Heflin et al., 2003), 
suggesting that firms with higher leverage and negative reported profits are more 
likely to have a higher information gap prior to their earnings announcement dates. 
Contrary to expectations the coefficients on MB are negative and significant at the 
0.10 level for the event window periods [-2,+3] and [-3,+3] for the OLS models. The 
coefficient on MV is negative and statistically significant at the 0.10 and 0.05 levels 
for the OLS regression models in the event window periods [-2,+3] and [-2,+4] 
respectively. This suggests that investors in large firms anticipate information arrival 
earlier than those in small firms and more quickly move stock prices closer to their 
full information post-announcement level. The finding of a negative coefficient on 
MV is consistent with the evidence in Atiase (1985) and Freeman (1987). The 
coefficients on EUSP are generally positive across all models and significant at the 
0.10 level in the OLS models for event window periods [-2,+4], [-3,+3] and [-3,+5],  
suggesting that a greater earnings surprise is associated with a more significant price 
reaction to the announcement.  
The coefficients on NEGCAR are positive and significant at the 0.05 level in the 
event window period [-2,+3] (both the OLS and fixed effects models) and in the event 
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window periods [-2,+4] and [-3,+3] (fixed effects models only). This supports the 
results reported in recent literature (Heflin et al., 2003) that firms that announce losses 
or have a negative abnormal return in the pre-announcement period experience a 
larger price reaction to the earnings announcement. 
In Table 8 we repeat the regression analysis undertaken in Table 7 for the event 
window periods [-2,+3] and [-2,+4], except we divide the sample evenly into small 
and large firms based on the market capitalisation of the firm in the 2001 fiscal year-
end. The results in Table 8 show that for small firms the coefficient on REFORM is 
negative and significant at the 0.10 level or better for both event window periods 
under the OLS and fixed effects regression models. In contrast for large firms the 
coefficient on REFORM is positive but not significant. This suggests that the 
empirical support for H2 is driven by small firms. This may reflect greater analyst 
coverage for larger firms and more disclosures by large firms in both pre-reform and 
post-reform (e.g. Arbel et al., 1983; Bhushan, 1989).18
INSERT TABLE 8 HERE 
For small firms the coefficient on EUSP is positive and significant at the 0.10 level in 
the fixed effects regression model for both event window periods [-2,+3] and [-2,+4]. 
For small firms the coefficient on NEGCAR is also positive and significant at the 0.05 
and 0.10 level in the fixed effect model respectively over the event window periods [-
2,+3] and [-2,+4]. 
                                                 
18 The very large firms stocks that are dual listed on the Australian Stock Exchange would be already 
subject to a continuous disclosure regime similar to that introduced into New Zealand. 
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8. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this study we examine the impact of the introduction of an enhanced continuous 
disclosure regime in December 2002 on the information environment for NZX-listed 
stocks. The aim of the reforms was to enhance investor confidence in the New 
Zealand equity market by requiring companies to immediately disclose all price-
sensitive information rather than having information being treated as an asset of the 
firm. The new continuous disclosure rules of the NZX also received statutory backing. 
We hypothesise that the requirement for more timely disclosure of price-sensitive 
information will improve analysts’ forecast performance and move stock prices closer 
to their full-information price level. 
Our univariate analysis finds that the reforms had a beneficial impact on both 
analysts’ forecast error and forecast dispersion. After controlling for other factors, we 
found there was a significant improvement in analysts’ forecast dispersion, but not in 
forecast error, in the post-reform period, providing partial support for our first 
hypothesis. Nonetheless, our results are broadly consistent with the intent of the 
reform and the results of studies examining the impact of either the ED reform of 
1994 in Australia (Brown et al., 1999) and the Reg FD reform of 2000 enacted in the 
US (e.g., Heflin et al., 2003; Bailey et al., 2003; Irani et al., 2003).  
Our results vis-a-vis those reported by Brown et al. (1999) are also significant since 
the changes introduced in New Zealand were arguably less dramatic than those 
introduced by the ED reform in Australia in 1994.19 Our results suggest that the 
reforms were associated with an improvement in the flow of information to investors 
rather than with a disruption in the information flow feared by critics of the reform. 
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In respect of informational efficiency, our univariate analyses show that the ACARs 
around the earnings announcement date event window periods are generally lower in 
the post-reform period, consistent with a smaller information gap after the 
implementation of the reform. This result holds after controlling for other factors. Our 
regression results also suggest that the impact of the reform with respect to price 
efficiency was greatest for small firms. These findings are consistent with our second 
hypothesis and with the results of prior research examining the impact of both the ED 
reform in Australia (e.g., Brown et al., 1999) and the Reg FD reform in the US (e.g., 
Heflin et al., 2003). Again, these results suggest that concerns over the reform 
disrupting the price formation process were unwarranted. 
While some caution is needed in the interpretation of our results, we find that the 
disclosure reform of 2002 had a beneficial impact on the information environment for 
NZX-listed stocks, consistent with the intent of the reforms. Our findings are stronger 
than the results of prior research examining the impact of a similar reform in Australia 
(e.g. Brown et al., 1999). In addition our results offer evidence contrary to the 
proposition that successful prosecution of violations of securities markets regulations 
rather than the introduction of sanctions is essential to changing firm and market 
behaviour (e.g., Bhattacharya et al., 2002). 
                                                                                                                                            
19 For example, see Pankhurst (2002) 
 34
References 
Abarbanell, J. S., W. N. Lanen, and R. E. Verrecchia (1995), Analysts' forecasts as 
proxies for investor beliefs in empirical research, Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp. 31-60. 
Arbel, A., S. Carvell, and P. Strebel (1983), Giraffes, institutions and neglected firms, 
Financial Analysts Journal, Vol. 39, No. 3, pp. 57-63. 
Atiase, R. K., (1985), Predisclosure information, firm capitalization, and security 
price behavior around earnings announcements, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 
23, No. 1, pp. 21-36. 
Bailey, W., H. Li, C. X. Mao, and R. Zhong, (2003), Regulation Fair Disclosure and 
earnings information: market, analyst, and corporate responses, Journal of Finance, 
Vol. 58, No. 6, pp. 2487-2514. 
Ball, R., and P. Brown, (1968)), An empirical evaluation of accounting income 
numbers, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 159-178. 
Beaver, W. H., (1968), The information content of annual earnings announcements, 
Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 6, pp. 67-92. 
Belsley, D. A., E. Kuh and R. E. Welsch, (1980), Regression Diagnostics, New York: 
John Wiley and Sons Inc. 
Bhattacharya, U. and H. Daouk, (2002), The world price of insider trading, Journal of 
Finance, Vol. 57, No. 1, pp. 75-108. 
Bhushan, R., (1989), Firm characteristics and analyst following, Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, Vol. 11, No. 2&3, pp. 255-274. 
Brown, L. D., R. L. Hagerman, P. A. Griffin and M. E. Zmijewski, (1987), Security 
analyst superiority relative to univariate time-series models in forecasting quarterly 
earnings, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 61-87. 
Brown, P., S. L Taylor, and T. S. Walter, (1999), The impact of statutory sanctions on 
the level and information content of voluntary corporate disclosure, Abacus, Vol. 35, 
No. 2, pp. 138-162. 
Christie, A. A., (1982), The stochastic behavior of common stock variances:  Value, 
leverage and interest rate effects, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 10, No. 4, pp. 
407-432. 
Collins, D. W., and S. P. Kothari, (1989), An analysis of intertemporal and cross-
sectional determinants of earnings response coefficients, Journal of Accounting & 
Economics, Vol. 11, No. 2&3, pp. 143-181. 
Dalziel, L., (2002), Securities bill builds confidence, New Zealand Herald, December 
3. 
Dhaliwal, D. S., K. J. Lee, and N. L. Fargher, (1991), The association between 
unexpected earnings and abnormal security returns in the presence of financial 
leverage, Contemporary Accounting Research, Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 20-41. 
Dubow, B. and N. Monterio, (2006), Measuring market cleanliness, Financial 
Services Authority, Occasional paper series 23. 
 35
Dunstan, K., G. Gallery and T. Troung, (2005), The impact of New Zealand's 
statutory-backed continuous disclosure regime on corporate disclosure behaviour, 
working paper, Victoria University of Wellington. 
 , (2006), The impact of the statutory-backed 
continuous regime on the market reaction to management earnings forecasts and 
earnings announcements in New Zealand, working paper, Victoria University of 
Wellington. 
Francis, J., J. D. Hanna and L. Vincent, (1996), Causes and effects of discretionary 
asset write-offs, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 34, pp. 117-134. 
Franks, S., (2002), Govt favours obtuse over obvious, New Zealand Herald, June 11. 
Freeman, R. N., (1987), The association between accounting earnings and security 
returns for large and small firms, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 9, No. 
2, pp. 195-228. 
Frijns, B., A. Gilbert and A. Tourani-Rad, (2006), Insider trading, regulation and the 
components of the bid-ask spread, working paper, Auckland University of 
Technology. 
Gaver, J. and K. Gaver, (1993), Additional evidence on the association between the 
investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend and compensation 
policy. Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 16, No. 1-3, pp. 125-160. 
Gaynor, B., (2002), Get ready for new disclosure rules, New Zealand Herald, 
November 16. 
_________, (2003), Warning signs disclose problems, New Zealand Herald, February 
22. 
Hayn, Carla, (1995), The information content of losses, Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, Vol. 20, No. 2, pp. 125-153. 
Heflin, F., K. R. Subramanyam, and Y. Zhang, (2003), Regulation FD and the 
financial information environment: early evidence, Accounting Review, Vol. 78, No. 
1, pp. 1-37. 
Holthausen, R. W. and R. E. Verrecchia, (1988), The effect of sequential information 
release on the variance of price changes in an intertemporal multi-asset market, 
Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 26, No. 1, pp. 82-106. 
Howe, J.S. and G.G. Schlarbaum, (1986), SEC trading suspensions: empirical 
evidence, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 21, No. 3, pp. 323-
333. 
Irani, A. J. and I. Karamanou, (2003), Regulation Fair Disclosure, analyst following, 
and analyst forecast dispersion, Accounting Horizons, Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 15-29. 
Kim, O., (1993), Disagreements among shareholders over a firm's disclosure policy. 
Journal of Finance, Vol. 48, No. 2, pp. 747-760. 
Kim, O. and R. E. Verrecchia, (1991), Market reaction to anticipated announcements, 
Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 30, No. 2, pp. 273-309. 
Kim, O. and R. E. Verrecchia, (1994), Market liquidity and volume around earnings 
announcements, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 17, No. 1&2, pp. 41-67. 
 36
Kross, W., B. Ro and D. Schroeder, (1990), Earnings expectations: the analysts' 
information advantage, Accounting Review, Vol. 65, No. 2, pp. 461-476. 
Kryzanowski, L., (1978), Misinformation and regulatory actions in the Canadian 
capital markets; some empirical evidence, Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 9, No. 2, 
pp. 335-368. 
______________, (1979), The efficacy of trading suspensions: a regulatory action 
designed to prevent the exploitation of monopoly information, Journal of Finance, 
Vol. 34, No. 5, pp. 1187-1200. 
Kwon, S. S., (2002), Financial analysts' forecast accuracy and dispersion: high-tech 
versus low-tech stocks, Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Vol. 19, No. 
1, pp. 65-91. 
Lang, M. H., and R. J. Lundholm, (1996), Corporate disclosure policy and analyst 
behavior, Accounting Review, Vol. 71, No. 4, pp. 467-492. 
Lee, D. and M. Liu, (2006), Does more information in stock price lead to greater or 
smaller idiosyncratic return volatility?, working paper, University of Kentucky. 
Maynes, E. and J. Rumsey, (1993), Conducting event studies with thinly traded 
stocks, Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 145-157. 
Mensah, Y. M., X. Song, and S. S. M. Ho, (2004), The effect of conservation on 
analysts' annual earnings forecast accuracy and dispersion, Journal of Accounting, 
Auditing & Finance, Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 159-183. 
New Zealand Exchange, (2002), Continuous Disclosure. 
http://www.nzx.com/regulation/listed_issuer/Continuous_Disclosure. 
New Zealand Exchange, (2005), Guidance Note - Continuous Disclosure. 
http://www.nzx.com/regulation 
Pankhurst, P., (2002), Securities law shake-up, not an earthquake. New Zealand 
Herald, December 2. 
Patell, J., (1976), Corporate forecasts of earnings per share and stock price 
behavior:  Empirical tests, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 14, No. 2, pp. 
246-276. 
Poskitt, R. and P. Yang, (2005), The impact of disclosure reform on information risk 
in NXZ-listed stocks, forthcoming in Pacific Accounting Reveiw. 
Ro, B. T., (1988), Firm size and the information content of annual earnings 
announcements, Contemporary Accounting Research, Vol. 4, No. 2, pp. 438-449. 
Securities Commission, (2002), Strengthening confidence in New Zealand's capital 
markets, http://www.sec-com.govt.na/publications/documents/capital_markets.shtml. 
Steen, C. H., (1994), The econometrics of fraud-on-the-market securities fraud, 
Journal of Legal Economics, Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 11-45. 
Talosig, P., (2004), Regulation FD - fairly disruptive? An increase in capital market 
inefficiency, Fordham Journal of Corporate and Financial Law, Vol. 9, No. 3, pp. 
637-714. 
The Financial Services Authority, (2000), UK Listing Authority: continuing 
obligations guide, http://www.fsa.gov.uk, May, pp. 1-41. 
 37
Unger, L. S., (2001), Special Study; Regulation fair Disclosure revisited. Securities 
and Exchange Commission. http://www.wec.gov/news/studies/regfdstudy.htm 
Wilkinson, B., (2003), Reform of securities trading law: evolution and risks, 
LexisNexis Conference: Securities Markets and Institutions. 
 
 38
 39
 
Table 1 
Absolute Analyst Forecast Error and Forecast Dispersion 
 Forecast error Forecast dispersion 
 N = 160 N = 151 
 Mean Median Mean Median 
Pre-reform 0.0253 0.0092 0.0118 0.0063 
Post-reform 0.0429 0.0060 0.0072 0.0043 
Difference -0.0176 0.0032 0.0046 0.0020 
p-value (0.26) (0.27) (0.02) (0.01) 
Forecast error is the absolute value of the difference between actual earnings and the mean of the 
individual analyst forecasts scaled by the firm’s share price at the end of the fiscal year. Forecast 
dispersion is the standard deviation of the individual analysts’ forecasts scaled by the firm’s share price 
at the end of fiscal year. N is the total number of observations. The pre-reform period is the period from 
1 January 2001 to 31 December 2002, while the post-reform period is the period from 1 January 2003 
to 31 December 2004. All p-values are two-sided. P-values for means are from t-tests of the difference 
between the pre- and post-reform means. For medians, p-values are from Mann Whitney U tests. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for Control Variables in the Regressions of Absolute Forecast Error and Forecast Dispersion 
 Mean Median 
 Overall Pre-reform Post-reform p-value Overall Pre-reform Post-reform p-value 
MV 5.7880 5.6784 5.8975 (0.27) 5.4779 5.2857 5.7299 (0.17) 
DAYS 2.4107 2.4338 2.3876 (0.77) 2.6020 2.6020 2.6020 (0.85) 
ANA 4.9750 4.9875 4.9625 (0.95) 5.0000 5.0000 5.0000 (0.92) 
ESUP 0.0524 0.0364 0.0684 (0.17) 0.0173 0.0127 0.0196 (0.08) 
NEGE 0.4313 0.5000 0.3625 (0.08) 0.0000 0.5000 0.0000 (0.08) 
LOSS 0.0938 0.0875 0.1000 (0.79) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (0.79) 
         
Panel B: Pearson Correlations among the Dependent Variables, REFORM Indicator and the Control Variables 
 FD REFORM MV DAYS ANA ESUP NEGE LOSS 
FE 0.3728** 0.0892 -0.0171 -0.0022 -0.1134 0.8913** 0.1289 0.5799** 
FD  -0.1931** -0.2001* 0.1056 -0.2013** 0.2940** -0.1388 0.4248** 
REFORM   0.0876 -0.0233 -0.0053 0.1089 -0.1388 0.0214 
MV    0.1321 0.6630** 0.0166 -0.0722 0.0495 
DAYS     0.1164 -0.0102 -0.0250 0.0989 
ANA      -0.1068 0.0253 -0.0513 
ESUP        0.1035 0.4160** 
NEGE        0.1962* 
FE = the absolute value of the difference between actual earnings and the mean of the individual analyst forecasts scaled by the firm’s share price at the end of the fiscal year; 
FD = the standard deviation of the individual analysts’ forecast scaled by the firm’s share price at the end of the fiscal year; REFORM = 1 if the observation is from the post-
reform period, and 0 otherwise; MV = natural log of the firm’s total market capitalization at the beginning of the fiscal year; DAYS = natural log of the average number of 
days by which the forecast precedes the earnings announcement; ANA = the number of analysts who generate a mean forecast of earnings; ESUP = the absolute value of the 
difference between the current year’s EPS and last year’s EPS, divided by the price at the beginning of the fiscal year; NEGE = 1 if current earnings are below previous 
earnings, and 0 otherwise; LOSS = 1 if reported profits are negative, and 0 otherwise. All p-values are two-sided. P-values for means are from t-tests of the difference 
between the pre- and post-reform means. For medians, p-values are from Mann Whitney U tests. **Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). * Correlation is 
significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 3 
Regression of Absolute Analyst Forecast Error on REFORM Indicator and Control Variables 
FEit = α + λ REFORM + λ MV0 1 2 it+ λ DAYS3 it + λ ANA4 it+ λ  ESUP5 it+ λ NEGE6 it + λ LOSS7 it + λ FD8 it + eit
  Model 1 OLS Model 2 Fixed effects Model 3 OLS Model 4 Fixed effects 
Variable Predicted sign Coefficient (t stats) Coefficient (t stats) Coefficient (t stats) Coefficient (t stats) 
Constant 
 
0.0179 
(0.98) 
-0.0030 
(-0.03) 
0.0050 
(0.40) 
0.0027 
(0.08) 
REFORM -ve 
 
0.0015 
(0.22) 
0.0022 
(0.26) 
0.0013 
(0.19) 
0.0025 
(0.32) 
MV -ve 
 
-0.0028 
(-1.04) 
0.0001 
(0.01)   
DAYS +ve 
 
-0.0021 
(-0.60) 
-0.0030 
(-0.63) 
-0.0025 
(-0.71) 
-0.0028 
(-0.60) 
ANA -ve 
   
-0.0006 
(-0.38) 
-0.0018 
(-0.51) 
ESUP +ve 
 
0.5257 
(21.51)*** 
0.5022 
(15.38)*** 
0.5241 
(21.35)*** 
0.4988 
(14.97)*** 
NEGE +ve 
 
-0.0030 
(-0.43) 
-0.0070 
(-0.82) 
-0.0025 
(-0.36) 
-0.0067 
(-0.79) 
LOSS +ve 
 
0.0827 
(6.33)*** 
0.1001 
(5.84)*** 
0.0812 
(6.23)*** 
0.0981 
(5.66)*** 
FD +ve 
 
0.3327 
(1.01) 
0.4938 
(0.98) 
0.3907 
(1.20) 
0.5047 
(1.03) 
Adjusted R2  0.845 0.870 0.845 0.870 
F test for no fixed 
effects   0.37  0.40 
FE = the absolute value of the difference between actual earnings and the mean of the individual analyst forecasts scaled by the firm’s share price at the end of the fiscal year; 
REFORM = 1 if the observation is from the post-reform period, and 0 otherwise; MV = natural log of the firm’s total market capitalization at the beginning of the fiscal year; DAYS = 
natural log of the average number of days by which the forecast precedes the earnings announcement; ANA = the number of analysts who generate a mean forecast of earnings; ESUP 
= the absolute value of the difference between the current year’s EPS and last year’s EPS, divided by the firm’s share price at the beginning of the fiscal year; NEGE = 1 if current 
earnings are below previous earnings, and 0 otherwise; LOSS = 1 if reported profits are negative, and 0 otherwise; FD = the standard deviation of the individual analysts’ forecast 
scaled by the firm’s share price at the end of fiscal year. T-statistics are in parentheses. *** Significant at the 0.01 level; ** Significant at the 0.05 level; *Significant at the 0.10 level 
 
 41 
42 
  Model 1 OLS Model 2 Fixed effects Model 3 OLS Model 4 Fixed effects 
Variable Predicted Coefficient (t stats) Coefficient (t stats) Coefficient (t stats) Coefficient (t stats) 
Constant 
 
0.0176 
(4.00)*** 
0.0576 
(3.10)*** 
0.0110 
(3.55)*** 
0.0133 
(2.08)** 
REFORM -ve 
 
-0.0047 
(-2.76)*** 
-0.0020 
(-1.21) 
-0.0050 
(-2.91)*** 
-0.0041 
(-2.76)*** 
MV -ve 
 
-0.0020 
(-2.93)*** 
-0.0091 
(-2.46)***   
DAYS +ve 
 
0.0013 
(1.49) 
0.0006 
(0.69) 
0.0012 
(1.38) 
0.0002 
(0.19) 
ANA -ve 
   
-0.0009 
(-2.24)** 
0.0003 
(0.48) 
ESUP +ve 
 
0.0135 
(2.21)** 
-0.0040 
(-0.64) 
0.0122 
(1.96)* 
-0.0036 
(-0.55) 
NEGE +ve 
 
0.0013 
(0.75) 
0.0018 
(1.09) 
0.0017 
(0.99) 
0.0013 
(0.79) 
LOSS +ve 
 
0.0137 
(4.39)*** 
0.0058 
(1.77)* 
0.0130 
(4.11)*** 
0.0077 
(2.31)** 
 
Adjusted R2  0.268 0.643 0.251 0.623 
F test for no 
fixed effects   2.70***  2.54*** 
FD = the standard deviation of the individual analysts’ forecast scaled by the firm’s share price at the end of the fiscal year; REFORM = 1 if the 
observation is from the post-reform period, and 0 otherwise; MV = natural log of the firm’s total market capitalization at the beginning of the fiscal 
year; DAYS = natural log of the average number of days by which the forecast precedes the earnings announcement; ANA = the number of analysts 
who generate mean forecast of earnings; ESUP = the absolute value of the difference between the current year’s EPS and last year’s EPS, divided by 
the firm’s share price at the beginning of the fiscal year; NEGE = 1 if current earnings are below previous earnings, and 0 otherwise; LOSS = 1 if 
reported profits are negative, and 0 otherwise. T-statistics are in parentheses. *** Significant at the 0.01 level; ** Significant at the 0.05 level; 
*Significant at the 0.10 level 
Table 4 
Regression of Forecast Dispersion on REFORM Indicator and Control Variables 
FDit = α + λ REFORM + λ MV0 1 2 it+ λ DAYS3 it+ λ ANA4 it+ λ ESUP5 it + λ NEGE6 it + λ LOSS7 it + eit
 
 
  43
 
Figure 1 
Price Discovery Pre-reform v Post-reform 
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Panel B: Median Absolute Cumulative Abnormal 
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Each panel depicts the absolute cumulative abnormal returns where the accumulation period begins on day –
10 and continues through day +10 relative to the earnings announcement date. Abnormal returns are 
prediction errors from the market model, estimated over 180 trading days prior to the event window period 
[-10,+10]. 
 
  
Table 5 
Absolute Cumulative Abnormal Returns (ACARi,t) and Pre- and Post-reform Earnings Announcements 
Event 
window 
period 
ACAR [-2, +3] ACAR [-2,+4] ACAR [-3,+3] ACAR [-3,+4] ACAR [-10,+3] 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Pre-reform 0.0584 0.0351 0.0583 0.0340 0.0605 0.0410 0.0632 0.0381 0.0686 0.0497 
Post-reform 0.0415 0.0305 0.0430 0.0313 0.0453 0.0391 0.0472 0.0337 0.0536 0.0410 
Difference 0.0169 0.0046 0.0153 0.0027 0.0152 0.0019 0.0160 0.0044 0.0150 0.0087 
p-value 0.025 0.152 0.036 0.255 0.037 0.231 0.054 0.126 0.126 0.196 
ACARi,t is the absolute cumulative abnormal return from t =- x days before to t = +y days after firm i’s annual earnings announcement.  Abnormal returns are prediction 
errors from the market model, estimated over 180 trading days prior to the event window period [-10,+10]. The pre-reform period is the period from 1 January 2001 to 31 
December 2002. The post-reform period is the period from 1 January 2003 to 31 December 2004. All p-values are two-sided. P-values for means are from t-tests of the 
difference between the pre- and post-reform means. For medians, p-values are from Mann Whitney U tests 
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Table 6 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for Control Variables in Regression of Absolute Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
 Mean Median 
 Overall Pre-reform Post-reform p-value Overall Pre-reform Post-reform p-value 
MB 2.466 2.550 2.3813 0.745 1.400 1.450 1.4000 0.814 
LEV 0.4615 0.4729 0.4501 0.429 0.4564 0.4564 0.4581 0.406 
MV 5.1884 5.1375 5.2392 0.600 4.9967 4.8814 5.1459 0.397 
ESUP 0.1718 0.1569 0.1867 0.746 0.0317 0.0380 0.0290 0.832 
LOSS 0.1371 0.1452 0.1290 0.713 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.714 
NEGCAR 0.4135 0.4194 0.4113 0.898 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.899 
         
Panel B: Pearson Correlations among the REFORM Indicator and the Control Variables 
 MB LEV MV EUSP LOSS NEGCAR 
REFORM -0.2075 -0.0504 0.0335 0.0207 -0.0235 -0.0082 
MB  0.2017*** 0.2235*** 0.0578 0.0987 -0.0069 
LEV   0.1432** -0.0524 0.1967*** -0.0131 
MV    -0.2588*** -0.1256** 0.0326 
ESUP     0.3265*** -0.0974 
LOSS      0.1694* 
REFORM = 1 if the earnings announcement is from the post-reform period, and 0 otherwise; MB = the ratio of the market to book value of equity at the beginning of the 
firm’s fiscal year; LEV = the ratio of total liabilities to total assets; MV = natural log of the firm’s total market capitalization at the beginning of the fiscal year; ESUP = the 
absolute value of the difference between the current year’s EPS and last year’s EPS, divided by the firm’s share price at the beginning of the fiscal year; LOSS = 1 if the 
reported profit is negative, and 0 otherwise; NEGCARi equals 1 if the cumulative abnormal return is negative over the event window period [-10,+3], and 0 otherwise. All p-
values are two-sided. p-values for means are from t-tests of the difference between the pre- and post-reform means. For medians, p-values are from Mann Whitney U tests. 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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 Table 7 
Regression of Absolute Cumulative Abnormal Returns on the TREFORM Indicator and Control Variables 
ACARi,t = α +λ REFORM + λ MBx,0 1 2 it + λ LEV3 it + λ MV4 it + λ ESUP5 it + λ LOSS6 it + λ NEGCAR7 it + ei,t
Event window period [-2,+3] [-2,+4] [-3,+3] [-3,+5] [-10,+3] 
Variable Predicted
sign 
 OLS Fixed 
effects 
 OLS Fixed 
effects 
 OLS Fixed 
effects 
 OLS Fixed 
effects 
 OLS Fixed 
effects 
Intercept 
  
0.0587 
(3.81)*** 
-0.0393 
(-0.49) 
0.0690 
(4.60)*** 
0.0532 
(0.69) 
0.0595 
(4.04)*** 
-0.0410 
(-0.53) 
0.0601 
(3.54)*** 
-0.0463 
(-0.51) 
0.0843 
(4.24)*** 
0.1056 
(0.95) 
REFORM 
 
-ve 
 
-0.0156 
(-2.17)** 
-0.0153 
(-2.28)** 
-0.0142 
(-2.03)** 
-0.0128 
(-2.00)** 
-0.0104 
(-2.04)** 
-0.0140 
(-2.16)** 
-0.0146 
(-1.85)* 
-0.0156 
(-2.04)** 
-0.0136 
(-1.43) 
-0.0121 
(-1.31) 
MB 
 
+ve 
 
-0.0016 
(-1.69)* 
-0.0010 
(-0.49) 
-0.0008 
(-0.89) 
0.0019 
(1.00) 
-0.0015 
(-1.67)* 
-0.0012 
(-0.63) 
-0.0016 
(-1.59) 
-0.0014 
(-0.61) 
-0.0006 
(-0.47) 
0.0017 
(0.64) 
LEV 
 
+ve 
 
0.0298 
(1.79)* 
0.0854 
(1.93)* 
0.0215 
(1.33) 
0.0600 
(1.43) 
0.0277 
(1.74)* 
0.0814 
(1.91)* 
0.0408 
(2.22)** 
0.0713 
(1.45) 
0.0226 
(1.03) 
0.0430 
(0.71) 
MV 
 
-ve 
 
-0.0045 
(-1.76)* 
0.0030 
(0.27) 
-0.0056 
(-2.25)** 
-0.0086 
(-0.83) 
-0.0039 
(-1.59) 
0.0051 
(0.49) 
-0.0044 
(-1.55) 
0.0052 
(0.43) 
-0.0063 
(-1.88)* 
-0.0115 
(-0.77) 
ESUP 
 
+ve 
 
0.0082 
(1.51) 
0.0087 
(1.38) 
0.0099 
(1.87)* 
0.0088 
(1.47) 
0.0093 
(1.78)* 
0.0100 
(1.64) 
0.0111 
(1.85)* 
0.0071 
(1.01) 
0.0095 
(1.33) 
-0.0064 
(-0.74) 
LOSS 
 
+ve 
 
0.0339 
(2.95)*** 
0.0140 
(1.03) 
0.0259 
(2.32)** 
0.0067 
(0.52) 
0.0357 
(3.24)*** 
0.0170 
(1.30) 
0.0317 
(2.50)** 
-0.0017 
(-0.11) 
0.0413 
(2.76)*** 
0.0155 
(0.84) 
NEGCAR 
 
+ve 
 
0.0074 
(2.08)** 
0.0174 
(2.30)** 
0.0106 
(1.48) 
0.0142 
(1.97)** 
0.0117 
(1.66) 
0.0141 
(1.94)** 
0.0093 
(1.15) 
0.0127 
(1.53)   
Adjusted R2  0.108  0.092  0.111  0.094  0.073  
F test for no 
fixed effects   1.85***  2.11***  1.79***  1.76***  1.49** 
n  248 248 248 248 248 248 248 248 248 248 
ACARi,t = the absolute cumulative abnormal return from t = -x days before to t = +y days after firm i’s annual earnings announcement. REFORM = 1 if the earnings 
announcement is from the  post-reform period, and 0 otherwise; MB = the ratio of the market to book value of equity at the beginning of the fiscal year; LEV = the ratio of 
total liabilities to total assets;  MV = natural log of the firm’s total market capitalization at the beginning of the fiscal year; ESUP = the absolute value of the difference 
between the current year’s EPS and last year’s EPS, divided by the firm’s share price at the beginning of the fiscal year;; LOSS = 1 if reported profit is negative, and 0 
otherwise; NEGCARi equals 1 if the cumulative abnormal return is negative over the event window period [-10,+3], and 0 otherwise. The coefficients on the regression for 
each dependent variable are provided with the t-statistics are in parentheses. *** Significant at the 0.01 level; ** Significant at the 0.05 level; *Significant at the 0.10 level. 
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 Table 8 
Regression of Absolute Cumulative Abnormal Returns on the REFORM Indicator and Control Variables 
ACARi,t  = α +λ 1 REFORM + λ MBx,0 2 it + λ LEV3 it + λ MV4 it + λ ESUP5 it+ λ LOSS6 it + λ NEGCAR7 it + ei,t
  Small firms Large firms 
Event window period [-2,+3] [-2,+4] [-2,+3] [-2,+4] 
Variable Predict
sign 
 OLS Fixed 
effects 
 OLS Fixed 
effects 
 OLS Fixed 
effects 
 OLS Fixed 
effects 
Intercept 
  
0.0801 
(2.86)*** 
0.0951 
(1.86)* 
0.0820 
(2.86)*** 
0.1750 
(3.35)*** 
0.0141 
(0.43) 
0.1630 
(1.03) 
0.0203 
(0.66) 
0.1662 
(1.17) 
REFORM 
 
-ve 
 
-0.0202 
(-2.15)** 
-0.0224 
(-2.73)*** 
-0.0175 
(-1.81)* 
-0.0175 
(-2.09)** 
-0.0106 
(-0.95) 
-0.0048 
(-0.44) 
-0.0100 
(-0.96) 
-0.0052 
(-0.54) 
MB 
 
+ve 
 
-0.0026 
(-1.19) 
-0.0037 
(-1.56) 
0.0015 
(0.67) 
0.0027 
(1.14) 
-0.0017 
(-1.47) 
0.0029 
(0.86) 
-0.0018 
(-1.59) 
0.0017 
(0.58) 
LEV 
 
+ve 
 
0.0075 
(0.38) 
-0.0057 
(-0.10) 
0.0064 
(0.31) 
-0.0364 
(-0.65) 
0.0488 
(1.53) 
0.1630 
(2.42)** 
0.0483 
(1.61) 
0.1559 
(2.56)** 
MV 
 
-ve 
 
-0.0050 
(-0.81) 
0.0164 
(1.41) 
-0.0065 
(-1.03) 
-0.0004 
(-0.04) 
0.0001 
(0.00) 
-0.0343 
(-1.54) 
-0.0004 
(-0.08) 
-0.0334 
(-1.66) 
ESUP 
 
+ve 
 
0.0062 
(1.10) 
0.0099 
(1.76)* 
0.0071 
(1.22) 
0.0115 
(1.99)* 
0.0275 
(1.29) 
0.0004 
(0.02) 
0.0153 
(0.76) 
-0.0168 
(-0.76) 
LOSS 
 
+ve 
 
0.0281 
(1.92)* 
0.0024 
(0.14) 
0.0226 
(1.51) 
-0.0056 
(-0.33) 
0.0288 
(1.41) 
0.0434 
(1.92)* 
0.0213 
(1.11) 
0.0301 
(1.47) 
NEGCAR 
 
+ve 
 
0.0129 
(1.33) 
0.0186 
(2.07)** 
0.0076 
(0.76) 
0.0167 
(1.81)* 
0.0168 
(1.49) 
0.0209 
(1.73)* 
0.0137 
(1.30) 
0.0135 
(1.24) 
Adjusted R2  0.073  0.065  0.089  0.054  
F test for no fixed 
effects 
 
 2.68***  2.68***  1.61**  1.97*** 
n  124 124 124 124 124 124 124 124 
ACARi,t = the absolute cumulative abnormal return from t = - x days before to t = +y days after firm i’s annual earnings announcement. REFORM = 
1 if earnings announcement is from the  post-reform period, and 0 otherwise; MB = the ratio of the market to book value of equity at the beginning 
of the fiscal year; LEV = the ratio of total liabilities to total assets; MV = natural log of the firm’s total market capitalization at the beginning of the 
fiscal year;  ESUP = the absolute value of the difference between the current year’s EPS and last year’s EPS, divided by the firm’s share price at the 
beginning of the fiscal year; LOSS = 1 if reported profit is negative, and 0 otherwise; NEGCARi equals 1 if the cumulative abnormal return is 
negative over the event window period [-10,+3]. The coefficients on the regression for each dependent variable are provided with the t-statistics are 
in parentheses. *** Significant at the 0.01 level; ** Significant at the 0.05 level; *Significant at the 0.10 level 
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